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The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is one of the longest ongoing confrontations in the world. Not only 
is it a strategic priority for Europe, as the EU 2003 Security Strategy states, but Europe has also 
much to gain from conflict resolution.  Many have discussed the role the EU has to play, whether 
economic or also political, and one informed opinion is that the EU is underplaying its hand. The 
EU, whose principles and values tend to promote measures for conflict resolution, is not the only 
organisation to propose initiatives, but all attempts to end the conflict over these territories have so 
far failed. And even though the Occupied Territories are not  recognised internationally as part of 
Israel, the situation has remained unresolved for over 40 years now.
The European Commission 2013 Guidelines prohibit the issuing of EU grants, funding, prizes or 
scholarships to Israeli entities unless a settlement exclusion clause is included. Israeli institutions 
and bodies situated across the pre-1967 Green Line should be automatically ineligible. 
The EU lacks political influence but is the largest financial donor to the Palestinian Authority and 
biggest  trade partner for  Israel.  It  is  sometimes said that  the EU is  an “economic giant” but a 
“political dwarf”. Has the EU changed this through the 2013 Guidelines? 
The 2013 Guidelines seek to leverage the EU's economic position. It is the first time that the EU has 
shown  its  disagreement  with  Israeli  policy  not  just  through  political  statements  but  through 
economic policy. 
However, their effectiveness remains in doubt because Israel labels its products in a way that masks 
their geographical origin, making it difficult for the EU and its citizens to distinguish between Israel 
and the Occupied Territories.  
The core problem of these Guidelines is that they distinguish between Israel and Israeli companies 
in the Occupied Territories as if they were different, but very often they are separate parts of the 
same company. How then is the EU supposed to know who it can promote economic relations with?
The 2013 Guidelines could be no more than grandstanding. The EU seeks to honour its core values 
but  it cannot do so effectively due to its own internal divisions. 
The Guidelines lay the basis for an important turn in events but they do not ensure it will happen.  
Alone they are insufficient. There is a lack of specific measures, mechanisms and funding for these 
guidelines to be carried out and monitored. 
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Introduction
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict  is one of the longest ongoing confrontations in the world. “This 
conflict has become one of the principle determinants affecting the relationship of the Arab states 
with  the  world”  (Isma'i,  2011:  52).  The  2003  European  Security  Strategy  states  that  the 
“Arab-Israeli conflict is a strategic priority for Europe” and Rosemary Hollis (2004: 196) among 
others states that “Europe has much to gain from conflict resolution”. The conflict  is  a way of  
consolidating EU power but it also responds to many EU interests. Europe wants to have access to 
energy resources, is concerned about both Israel and Europe's security and is aware that immigrants 
from the area may import regional conflicts, for example in the form of terrorist threats (Al-Fattal,  
2010: 33). 
Not  only  the  EU  but  the  whole  international  community  has  rejected  “a  historical  claim”  or 
“biblical right” of the Jewish people to all of Palestine. Nonetheless, how much has actually been 
done to enforce international law, to end Israeli occupation and to stop the settlement expansion? In  
spite of repeated EU criticism of Israel – its 1982 invasion of Lebanon, Israeli annexation of East  
Jerusalem and  the  Golan  Heights,  its  handling  of  the  first  Palestinian  intifada,  the  continuous 
settlement drive and the construction of a separation barrier in violation of international law, the 
attack on the Gaza flotilla and the continued blockade of the Gaza Strip – this did not prevent the  
EU and its member states from developing excellent economic relations with Israel, including an 
EU-Israeli free trade agreement, Israeli participation in European research and development projects 
and its privileged status in the European Neighbourhood Policy framework. (Neugebauer, 2014)
The EU is often seen as a peace-maker, whose duty is to find solutions to conflicts (Diez, Pace,  
Rumelili and Viktorova, 2006: 34) and specifically border conflicts. The European Union can have 
a significant impact on the transformation of border conflicts. The question is, “Does it?”
Historical context
Due to the Six-Day War in 1967, between Israel and the neighbouring states of Egypt, Jordan and 
Syria, and the Yom-Kippur War in 1973 between a coalition of Arab states and Israel, during the 
1970s there was growing tension between Israel  and the  European Economic Community1 and 
1 The European Economic Community (EEC) was an international organization created by the Treaty of Rome of 
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closer ties between the EEC and Arab countries. Europe became one of the leading international 
supporters of Palestinian self-determination. This resulted in the Venice Declaration of the European 
Council of 1980: which because of Israeli rejection led to a loss of EU diplomatic influence over 
Israel. The EU only recovered some level of trust with Israel as a result of the Madrid Conference in 
19912,  after  which  the  EU  economic  role  in  the  region  increased  dramatically,  and  the  Oslo 
Agreements of 1993, which established the basis for a two-state solution for the first time. This was 
the last major European involvement in attempts to resolve the conflict. It  also set an important  
precedent for future developments: a steady increase in trade relations between Israel and the EU, 
and the emergence of the EU as the main external donor to the Palestinian Authority (Diez, Pace, 
Rumelili and Viktorova, 2006: 65). According to Agnès Bertrand-Sanz (in Bulut, 2010: 86), the EU 
has provided an average €500 million per year to the Palestinian Occupied Territories.
In this context the EU signed Association Agreements,  which contain a strong economic and a 
relatively weak political dimension (Stettler in Diez, Pace, Rumelili and Viktorova, 2006: 65) with 
Israel in 1995 and the Palestine Liberation Organization administration of the Palestinian Authority 
in 1997. Perthes (in Diez, Pace, Rumelili and Viktorova, 2006: 23) has argued that the EU is a 
so-called “payer” but not a ‘player’ in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
In  order  to  derive  some  influence  from  its  economic  position,  in  July  2013  the  European 
Commission released a press statement (see Annex A) summarising its new 2013 Guidelines (see 
Annex B),  whose  aim was  to  create  a  distinction  between Israel  and  the  Occupied  Territories 
regarding EU financial support of “Israeli entities and their activities in the territories occupied by 
Israel since June 1967 for grants, prizes and financial instruments funded by the EU from 2014 
onwards”. 
1957. It's aim was to bring about a common market and economic integration, among its six founding members: 
Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany
2 The EU was handed the responsibility for the Regional Economic Development Working Group, bringing together 
Palestinians, Israelis, Jordanians and Egyptians to develop economic cooperation projects in the region. 
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Research questions
What is the significance of these new Guidelines? Do they represent a turning point for EU policy 
and influence on Israel? Or are they just another tentative step forward that may be overtaken over  
by other events? 
The Guidelines are the first attempt by the EU to have political leverage through economic action. 
Previously the emphasis has been on diplomatic measures and always under the long shadow of US 
policy.  Quoting Nathalie Tocci (in Bulut, 2010: 26), “the European Union has privileged political 
dialogue as a means to influence Israel”. 
In this study we will make a tentative analysis of EU influence on the Israeli- Palestinian conflict in 
the light of the new Guidelines. We might find that the statement of the Guidelines is insufficient or  
on the contrary that they are overambitious, and that they might fail because of that, or that it is too  
early to gauge what effect the Guidelines are having or will have, or that the Guidelines may remain 
unused by EU member states or that there is insufficient funding of operational mechanisms, for 
example in providing effective customs control.
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EU influence on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict
In all situations of regional conflict, other countries can endeavour to exert an influence to protect 
their  own interest  in  a  variety of  ways:  through  international  organisations,  through their  own 
diplomatic  initiatives,  through  conditional  economic  support  and  trade,  through  cultural  and 
educational or research ties, and so on. In general terms, all of these channels of influence can be  
grouped into economic and political.
A payer or a player?
The EU is not only the biggest financial donor to the Palestinian Authority (PA) but it is also Israel's  
biggest buyer: according to Israel Ports Development & Assets Company Ltd. (IPC) Ltd, which is 
responsible for the development of Israel’s three commercial seaports in Haifa, Ashdod and Eilat, 
the EU accounts for 55% of Israel's foreign trade (€23 billion). The EU's first financial assistance to 
Palestinian  territories  was  in  1971  through  the  United  Nations  Relief  and  Work  Agency  for 
Palestine Refugees in the near East, the UNRWA and it has consistently been since then the largest  
aid donor for Palestinians (Al-Fattal, 2010: 54). 
The  main  bone  of  contention  between  different  authors  is  not  whether  the  EU is  a  “payer”  - 
undoubtedly it is - but if it is also a “player”, that is a party capable of influencing the resolution of  
the conflict. As Esra Bulut (2010: 43) puts it: “A multifaceted profile of a complex player, not just  
payer, emerges from the analysis of various dimensions of EU involvement”, emphasising the EU's 
political role in the conflict. Others, like Rosemary Hollis, argue that the EU stopped being a player 
by following the US in the Hamas boycott in 2006 and labelling it as a terrorist organisation (in 
Bulut, 2010: 45). Following the strategy of isolating Hamas, EU donations also decreased, thereby 
collectively punishing all the Gazan population and missing an opportunity to enhance Palestinian 
unity. This undermined the EU role as a potential stakeholder in the conflict. Others consider that 
the EU has never played a political role in the conflict and has only been able to have an influence 
through economic means. Voltolini asserts that despite its persistent and evident involvement the 
EU is considered an actor with a secondary role (Voltolini, 2013: 42) and Hollis (in Bulut, 2010: 32) 
affirms that the EU role is so limited that it “only acts when the USA gives it permission to”. Along 
the  same  lines  these  authors  establish  that  the  EU  political  role  is  extremely  unbalanced  in 
comparison to its economic impact, both through aid and trade. 
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Could the EU do more?
A further difference of opinion among analysts is the extent to which the EU is responsible for its 
own lack of influence, using Arab disunity as an excuse (Isma'i, 2011: 33), or whether the EU  is 
doing as much as it can in the face of the reluctance of the other parties to let it participate. Stettler 
(in Diez, Pace, Rumelili and Viktorova, 2006: 25) reminds us that, even if Palestinian activists have 
wished for the EU to take a more direct political role, they forget the “limited compulsory influence 
which the EU has on Israel”.  Möckli  (in  Bulut,  2010: 13) argues that  the difficulty in gaining 
recognition as a relevant agent in Middle East diplomacy has led to the EU desisting from trying to 
establish an independent role and has instead started “to seek to influence US policy”. Another 
disadvantage the EU suffers is as Möckli states (in Bulut, 2010: 14) that “neither the US nor Israel 
approve of a European role in Middle East diplomacy”. All too often EU statements and positions 
have lent weight to the “commonly held perception in Israel that Europe is pro-Palestinian”(in Diez, 
Pace, Rumelili and Viktorova, 2006: 31). An illustrative instance of this was in April 2001, when 
Shimon Peres, at the time Israel's Foreign Minister, publicly rejected an offer from the European 
Union to arbitrate in the conflict, affirming that Washington was Israel's preferred peace partner. 
Peters and Dachs (in Isma'i, 2004: 38) also state that there is the belief in Israel that Europe cannot  
be trusted. This has also lead some Arab states to overlook the EU role, holding the belief that at the 
end of the day “the US is the sole holder of influence” (Isma'i, 2011: 30). Others state that the  
European role has  oscillated between one that  resembles  that  of  an “independent  and effective 
partner and one that resembles that of a follower or a secondary partner” (Nafi'l, 2004: 136).
EU internal divisions
What all of  the authors seem to agree on is that the main obstacle to EU influence is internal  
division: EU member states are more united in terms of economic policy than in their political  
standpoint. As Al-Fattal (2010: 34) states: “the EU is an expression of the discussions among its 
member states, which makes the EU appear divided and paralysed at times. There is a disagreement 
on the conflict,  some put more emphasis  on Israel's  security while  others  put it  on the human 
security perspective.” For example, only 8 of the 27 states currently fully recognise the Palestinian 
Authority  (Sikorski,  2010:  34).  Hollins  (in  Bulut,  2010:  56)  points  to  “the  lowest  common 
denominator”, referring to the fact that any agreement only includes items that all member states 
can agree on. Hisham (in Isma'i, 2011: 38) identifies three main currents in the European Union:  
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one group lead by France, Italy, Spain and Ireland, who call for an active and effective European 
role regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict; another group lead by the United Kingdom which considers 
that the EU should not undertake a role that might place it in opposition to the USA; and finally a 
group around Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands and Denmark who tend to give full backing to 
US initiatives. Esra Bulut comments on “the puzzling diversity in the assessments of the EU role:  
what are the different objectives and priorities of those making them?”, which leads to some of the  
parties  seeing the  EU as  a  “inconsequential  actor  with  nevertheless  useful  funds  and  technical 
expertise.” (Bulut, 2010: 36)
The EU is also divided when it comes to its institutions. It  has so many different agencies that 
internal coordination is complicated. The EU has 16 different institutions and other bodies, among 
which are the European Parliament, the European Council, the European Commission and the Court 
of Justice of the European Union.
Subordination of EU policy to US policy
Where there is full agreement among the authors studied is that, regardless of a possible role for the 
EU, it certainly has not been a major player to date. Since 1967 Israel has become the dominant 
power in the Middle East, with unconditional US support, leaving very little space for the EU to  
manoeuvre. It is difficult for the EU to adopt an independent policy, with regard to the US for a 
variety of reasons: the limited political influence that economic assistance creates, the reluctance of 
the Israelis to allow the EU to play a central role, the belief among all the relevant actors that the 
United  States  is  the  truly  vital  player  in  any  peace  process,  Europe's  distaste  for  traditional  
balance-of-power politics, and the internal divisions within Europe. Due to its special relationship 
with Israel and the influence of the Jewish lobby on US policy, it is impossible for the US to play a 
neutral role (Hemmer, 2010: 22).
In this project we have aimed to discover if the EU has started to use its economic clout to put 
pressure on Israel politically. This would involve the EU using its role as a “payer” to become a 
“player”. Is the EU leveraging its payer role to become a player?
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The 2013 Guidelines
Up to 2013
The 2013 Guidelines are the latest in a series of political statements and initiatives coming out of 
Europe. Politically the EU position has not undergone any dramatic changes since a single foreign 
policy position on this matter was formulated in the 1970s (Diez, Pace, Rumelili and Viktorova, 
2006: 7) The EU has been quite unified as to what it considers to be the only way forward for 
conflict resolution in Israel and Palestine. It calls on Israel to withdraw its military forces from the 
Occupied Territories and to stop all settlement activities, including the evacuation of the existing 
settlements. Furthermore, it also calls for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State and 
a halt to any violent activities by Palestinians. Palestine and the Arab states must also recognise the 
state of Israel within its internationally recognised borders. (Isma'i, 2011: 17) Since the 1980s it has 
made  many  pronouncements on  Israeli  policies:  against  the  wall,  the  settlements  and  the 
occupation. It has also called for the establishment of an independent Palestinian State: “the EU has 
been quite consolidated (sic) over what it considers the only way forward for conflict resolution in 
Israel and Palestine; it is in the way to do it that the member states differ” (Diez, Pace, Rumelili and  
Viktorova,  2006:  7).  But  at  the  same  time relations  between  the  EU and  Israel  have  become 
“constantly deepening economic relations” (Sarto, 2011: 45) although the situation on the ground 
hasn't changed for the better, but rather has worsened. This lends support to the notion that current 
EU policy is to strengthen economic ties despite EU political ambiguity. The group of member 
states led by Germany seem to hope to continue without needing to take a firm stand either way if 
they can consolidate economic ties with both sides. As a result of this Europe has not intensified its 
diplomatic discourse while it has actively developed trade relations with Israel. Heller (2004: 34) 
mentions  that  “the  EU  has  been  receptive  to  Israeli  suggestions  to  separate  “politics”  from 
“economics” by compartmentalising the Arab-Israeli conflict from the development of EU-Israel  
relations”.  Should  we therefore  consider  the  EU an  “economic  giant”  but  a  “political  dwarf”? 
(Al-Fattal, 2010: 24)
Furthermore, as Sarto states, “the deepening of relations with Israel without applying any sort of 
conditionality (unlike in the case of Hamas, boycotted after the 2006 election victory in Gaza), has 
eroded the EU's legitimacy among the Palestinians,  and this is  far more pertinent than any EU 
concession to the Arab side” (Sarto, 2011: 34).
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In  1995  the  European  Union  and  Israel  signed  an  Association  Agreement.  Then,  in  1998  the 
European Union at various levels and through various bodies recognised the exceptional status of 
the Occupied Territories, excluding them from the terms of the Association Agreement. In February 
2010 the European Court of Justice established that “products originating in the West Bank do not 
qualify for preferential customs treatment under the EC-Israel Agreement”3. This was the first time 
that the EU differentiated Israel from the Occupied Territories, since until then as Hollis (in Bulut,  
2010: 98) states, “EU actions do not make clear distinctions between dealing with Israel per se and 
with Israeli enterprises and settlers in the Occupied Territories”. 
In effect, in 2010, the EU took its political discourse against the settlements a step further. But, has 
this changed the facts on the ground? The main problem is that Israel has established its de facto  
international borders to include the Occupied Territories. “Israel itself does not distinguish between 
the Occupied Territories and its internationally recognised territory” (Bulut, 2010: 23). Nonetheless 
Tocci (in Bulut, 2010: 54) has written that “Israel has not been required by the EU to acknowledge 
officially that  products  produced in settlements  do not  originate in Israel”,  provoking complex 
problems for the EU in establishing and labelling product origins, in particular since it is Israel that 
labels them.  As Anne Schuit (2014) states, “Israel  does not distinguish between the territory of 
Israel proper and the territories it occupies, and thus labels products stemming from the settlements 
to originate from Israel. Despite the fact that Israel hereby violates the provisions of the Agreement, 
the European Commission so far has not taken any meaningful steps to stop this practice. The EU 
leaves it to the individual member states to prevent settlement products from entering the European 
markets, and relies on their customs authorities to verify the origin of the products”.4
Publication of the 2013 Guidelines
The European Commission’s new Guidelines (see Annex B) regarding the award of EU support to 
Israeli  entities  or  to  their  activities  in  the  territories  occupied  by Israel  since  June  1967 made 
headlines for months in Israel. The feeling in Israel, according to Felix Neugebauer (2014), “is that 
for the first time an international body has taken an effective measure that goes beyond the usual  
verbal criticism of Israel’s activities in the Occupied Territories (the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the  
Golan  Heights  and  East  Jerusalem)”.  From  2014  onwards,  agreements  concerning 
3 Court of Justice of the European Union , PRESS RELEASE No 14/10 , Luxembourg, 25 February 2010
4 More information at:
http://www.ypri.org/research/34-eu-import-of-products-originating-from-the-israeli-settlements-on-the-west-bank
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community-funded programmes, such as research grants, scholarships and cultural exchanges, must 
state explicitly that they apply to Israel in its pre-1967 borders. 
The European Commission states that the EU “does not recognise Israel’s sovereignty” in any of the 
territories captured in  1967,  “irrespective of  their  legal  status  under domestic  Israeli  law.” (see 
Annex B) While this has been the EU position for years,  the new Guidelines, and the ongoing 
debate about labelling products from West Bank settlements, demonstrate that the EU is becoming 
increasingly impatient with Israel’s continuing ‘colonisation’ of the West Bank. 
The Guidelines are also a sign that the EU has realised that current Israeli policies may render 
inviable  the  two-state  solution,  that  the  EU  and  its  member  states  have  diplomatically  and 
economically supported ever since the Oslo process. Though disputing the legality of Israeli control 
of territories beyond the pre-1967 line, Brussels has always expressed its commitment to Israel’s  
security  and  right  to  exist.  While  EU  member  states  are  deeply  divided  with  regard  to  other 
questions dear to Israel, they have a common position on Israel’s settlement policy. The Guidelines 
distinguish between pre-1967 Israel and the territories; they delegitimise the occupation, not the 
state of Israel. (Neugebauer, 2014) 
Limited scope of the Guidelines
The Guidelines apply only to joint programmes of Israel and the European Union itself, not to the 
EU’s 28 member states’ bilateral relations with Israel. In effect, this provision waters down any 
impact  the  Guidelines  could  have  because  most  initiatives  both  economically,  such  as  import  
controls, and politically, such as cultural exchanges, take place at the nation state level.
A turning point?
The 2013 Guidelines represent a turning point in the context of EU-Israeli trade relations: never 
before has the EU proposed limitations of  this  kind on Israel.  This may be because Israel  and  
Europe share such strong economic relations that economic sanctions would also harm EU member 
states. Even though in 2004 the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs recognised that restrictions of 
this kind could harm the Israeli economy and cause serious economic and political damage to Israel, 
the EU failed to apply this kind of pressure for nine years. (Diez, Pace, Rumelili and Viktorova,  
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2006: 7) 
Are the Guidelines insufficient or overambitious?
The EU seems to underestimate its potential influence on Israel. Israel is not as dependent on EU 
money for survival as is the Palestinian Authority but EU financial aid and trade is by no means 
negligible. “Economic means have played a greater role in effecting a broader-scale political change 
in  Palestine”,  since  the  PA depends  on  substantial  EU  assistance  for  its  daily  existence  and 
management of its fledgling institutional structure.(Diez, Pace, Rumelili and Viktorova, 2006: 22) 
Aid  is  the  EU's  most  important  bargaining  chip,  since  it  is  the  largest  donor  in  the  region.  
Furthermore, trade relations offer significant leverage for the EU. According to Alejandro Pozo 
(2012), in his study “Security as a business”, Israeli arms exports to Europe totalled $1,600 million: 
one of Israel's biggest markets is defence.5 
Do  the  Guidelines  merely  pay  lip-service  to  EU  policy  on  ethical  trade  while  in  fact  the 
international military-industrial complex continues to operate on a basis of business as usual?
Operation of the Guidelines
We have been unable to find any data on specific funding for measures to implement the Guidelines 
in the EU as a whole and also for member states. The Guidelines refer to relations between Israel 
and the EU as a whole but without specific actions it is unclear how these Guidelines can be put  
into effect for the regulation of bilateral relations such as trade with member states. 
A further problem is the distinction between Israel and the Occupied Territories from a commercial 
point of view. Companies trading from the Occupied Territories are usually part of larger Israeli 
concerns and can easily camouflage the precise location of their activities.6
5 A major selling point for Israeli arms exports is that they are “tested in the field”. As the charity War on Want states: 
“The new Watchkeeper drone being developed for the UK military is based on a model that Israel has ‘field tested’ 
in  attacks  on  Gaza  which  left  many  Palestinians  dead,  including  children.”  More  information  available  at:  
http://www.waronwant.org/news/press-releases/18040-new-uk-drone-field-tested-on-palestinians
6 The charity Who Profits analyses which Israeli companies profit from the Occupation. Arava Export Growers is an 
example of an Israeli company based in Israel which also has market gardens in the Occupied Territories. For more 
information: http://www.whoprofits.org/company/arava-export-growers 
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Beyond the Guidelines
Some consider flourishing economic relations as an implicit acceptance of the current situation. As 
Al-Fattal states, “The EU has often applied post-conflict resolution mechanisms to the Palestinian 
Territories, while at the same time (deliberately or unintentionally) postponing or neglecting to deal 
with the  core  issue:  the occupation.”  Lending economic support  to  the  PA without  ending the 
occupation might be considered “a substitute for international political will and to compensate for 
the  lack  of  genuine  bilateral  negotiations  between  the  parties”(Al-Fattal,  2010:  19).  Aid  alone 
cannot buy peace. Right from the start the EU has used a post-conflict peace-building strategy when 
there is still a continuing conflict. To the point that international aid has in a way ended up being  
harmful: it attempts to shore up a tragic status quo.
There is a further factor that may have a decisive influence on the course of events: the growing 
social  movements  exerting  pressure  on  all  organisations  in  Israel  and  Europe.  The  Boycott, 
Divestment  and  Sanctions  (BDS) movement7 is  a  significant  example  of  this  kind  of  pressure 
group8. Through these actions European citizens are demanding that the EU honour its values of 
respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights. 
The growth of  these movements  has  gone hand in hand with the increasing severity of  Israeli  
actions. The BDS has become a lever for influencing the current state of affairs. It has failed so far 
to have a significant economic impact but it has raised awareness of what is going on in Israel and 
Palestine. This has made it harder for the EU to casually enter into new agreements.
It is too early to say for sure if the EU Guidelines are having any real effect. The policy is certainly  
in place and if the conditions are favourable in terms of social pressure and political will they may 
be applied. But, without continued pressure from social groups and political leaders the guidelines 
may be in the long run another missed opportunity. Are they worth the paper they are written on?
7 “In 2005, Palestinian civil society issued a call for a campaign of boycotts, divestment and sanctions (BDS) against 
Israel until it complies with international law and Palestinian rights.” The BDS is modelling its campaign on the 
Anti-Apartheid  campaign  which  took  place  in  the  1980s  in  South  Africa.  More  information  available  at: 
http://www.bdsmovement.net/
8 For example, at the beginning of this year “Dutch pension fund giant PGGM had withdrawn its investments from 
Israel's  five  largest  banks  because  of  their  involvement  in  West  Bank  settlements”.  Available  at: 
https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/articles/debate/10144-spring-in-the-step-of-bds-as-a-worried-israel-plans-push
back
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Conclusions
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, one of the longest in modern history is influenced by many different  
actors.  Many have  discussed  the  role  the  EU has  to  play in  it,  whether  it's  influence  is  only 
economic or also political, but many seem to believe that the EU is underplaying its hand. 
The 2013 Guidelines offer a new opportunity to intervene in the conflict, by deriving influence from 
the EU's economic position. Do the Guidelines point to a new political path? It is the first time that  
the EU has shown its  disagreement with Israeli policy not just  through political  statements but  
through economic policy. 
But, are they applicable? If Israel labels its products in a way that masks their geographical origin, it 
is difficult for the EU and its citizens to distinguish between Israel and the Occupied Territories.  
Further  research  is  necessary  to  evaluate  specific  indicators,  such  as  reported  human  rights 
infringements and expansion of settlements in the Occupied Territories. 
The core problem of these Guidelines is that they distinguish between Israel and Israeli companies 
in the Occupied Territories as if they were different, but very often they are separate parts of the 
same company. How then is the EU supposed to know who it can promote economic relations with?
The 2013 Guidelines could be no more than grandstanding. The EU seeks to honour its core values 
but is crippled by its own internal divisions. 
The Guidelines lay the basis for an important turn in events but they don't ensure it will happen.  
Alone they are insufficient. There is a lack of specific measures, mechanisms and funding for these 
guidelines to be carried out and evaluated. 
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Annex A: EU press statement 
Statement by the Delegation of the European Union to the State of Israel on the European 
Commission Notice (16.07.2013)
On June 30 European Commission adopted a Notice containing guidelines  on the eligibility of 
Israeli entities and their activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 for grants,  
prizes and financial instruments funded by the EU from 2014 onwards. These guidelines set out the 
territorial limitations under which the Commission will award EU support to Israeli entities
These  guidelines  were  prepared  as  a  follow up  to  the  political  decision  taken  by  the  foreign 
ministers of the EU Member States at the EU Foreign Affairs Council of 10 December 2012. This 
stated  that,  "all  agreements  between  the  State  of  Israel  and  the  EU  must  unequivocally  and  
explicitly indicate their inapplicability to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967."
The guidelines are also in conformity with the EU's longstanding position that Israeli settlements 
are illegal under international law and with the non-recognition by the EU of Israel's sovereignty 
over the occupied territories, irrespective of their legal status under domestic Israeli law.
At  the  moment  Israeli  entities  enjoy financial  support  and  cooperation with  the  EU and these 
guidelines are designed to ensure that this remains the case. At the same time concern has been 
expressed in Europe that Israeli entities in the occupied territories could benefit from EU support.
The purpose of these guidelines is to make a distinction between the State of Israel and the occupied 
territories when it comes to EU support.
The European External  Action Service has informed the Israeli  Mission to the EU prior  to  the 
publication of  the notice and has invited the Israeli  side to hold discussions on the agreements 
which are in preparation.
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Annex B: The 2013 Guidelines
19.7.2013 EN Official Journal of the European Union C 205/9
Guidelines on the eligibility of Israeli entities and their activities in the territories occupied by Israel 
since June 1967 for grants, prizes and financial instruments funded by the EU from 2014 onwards
2013/C 205/05
Section A.   GENERAL ISSUES 
1. These guidelines set out the conditions under which the Commission will implement key 
requirements for the award of EU support to Israeli  entities  or to their activities in the 
territories occupied by Israel since June 1967. Their aim is to ensure the respect of EU 
positions and commitments in conformity with international law on the non-recognition by 
the EU of Israel’s sovereignty over the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967. These 
guidelines are without prejudice to other requirements established by EU legislation.
2. The territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 comprise the Golan Heights, the Gaza 
Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem.
3. The EU does not recognise Israel’s sovereignty over any of the territories referred to in 
point 2 and does not consider them to be part of Israel’s territory , irrespective of their legal 
status under domestic Israeli law (2). The EU has made it clear that it will not recognise 
any changes to pre-1967 borders, other than those agreed by the parties to the Middle East 
Peace  Process  (MEPP) (3).  The  EU’s  Foreign  Affairs  Council  has  underlined  the 
importance of limiting the application of agreements with Israel to the territory of Israel as  
recognised by the EU (4).
4. These  guidelines  do  not  cover  EU  support  in  the  form  of  grants,  prizes  or  financial 
instruments awarded to Palestinian entities or to their activities in the territories referred to 
in point 2, nor any eligibility conditions set up for this purpose. In particular, they do not  
cover any agreements between the EU, on the one hand, and the Palestinian Liberation 
Organisation or the Palestinian Authority, on the other hand.
Section B.   SCOPE OF APPLICATION 
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5. These guidelines apply to EU support in the form of grants, prizes or financial instruments 
within the meaning of Titles VI, VII and VIII of the Financial Regulation (5)   which may be 
awarded to Israeli entities or to their activities in the territories occupied by Israel since 
June 1967. Their application is without prejudice to specific eligibility conditions which 
may be laid down in the relevant basic act.
6. These guidelines apply:
(a) for grants — to all applicants and beneficiaries,  irrespective of their role (sole 
beneficiary, coordinator or co-beneficiary). This includes entities participating in 
the  action  on  a  no-cost  basis (6)   and  affiliated  entities  within  the  meaning  of 
Article 122(2) of the Financial Regulation. This does not include contractors or 
sub-contractors  selected by grant beneficiaries in conformity with procurement 
rules.  As  regards  third  parties  referred  to  in  Article  137  of  the  Financial  
Regulation, in the cases where the costs of financial support to such third parties 
are  eligible  under a  call  for  proposals  the authorising officer  responsible may, 
where appropriate, specify in the call for proposals and in the grant agreements or 
decisions that the eligibility criteria set out in these guidelines also apply to the 
persons that may receive financial support by the beneficiaries;
(b) for prizes — to all participants and winners in contests;
(c) for  financial  instruments  —  to  dedicated  investment  vehicles,  financial 
intermediaries and sub-intermediaries and to final recipients.
7. These guidelines apply to grants,  prizes and financial instruments managed, as the case 
may be,  by the  Commission,  by executive  agencies  (direct  management)  or  by bodies 
entrusted  with  budget  implementation  tasks  in  accordance  with  Article  58(1)(c)  of  the 
Financial Regulation (indirect management).
8. These  guidelines  apply  to  grants,  prizes  and  financial  instruments  funded  from 
appropriations of the 2014 financial year and subsequent years and authorised by financing 
decisions adopted after the adoption of the guidelines.
Section C.   CONDITIONS OF ELIGIBILITY OF ISRAELI ENTITIES 
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9. As regards the place of establishment of Israeli entities:
(a) In  the  case  of  grants  and  prizes,  only Israeli  entities  having  their  place  of  
establishment within Israel’s pre-1967 borders will be considered eligible;
(b) In the case of financial instruments, only Israeli entities having their place of 
establishment within Israel’s pre-1967 borders will  be considered eligible as 
final recipients.
10. The place of establishment is understood to be the legal address where the entity is 
registered,  as  confirmed by a precise postal  address corresponding to  a  concrete 
physical location. The use of a post office box is not allowed.
11. The requirements set out in section C:
(a) apply  to  the  following  types  of  legal  persons:  Israeli  regional  or  local 
authorities and other public bodies, public or private companies or corporations 
and  other  private  legal  persons,  including  non-governmental  not-for-profit 
organisations;
(b) do not apply to Israeli  public  authorities at  national  level  (ministries  and 
government agencies or authorities);
(c) do not apply to natural persons.
Section  D.   CONDITIONS  OF  ELIGIBILITY  OF  ACTIVITIES  IN  THE  TERRITORIES 
OCCUPIED BY ISRAEL 
12. As regards the activities/operations of Israeli entities:
(a) In the case of grants and prizes, the activities of Israeli entities carried out 
in  the  framework  of  EU-funded  grants  and  prizes  will  be  considered 
eligible if they do not take place in the territories referred to in point 2, 
either partially or entirely;
(b) In the case of financial  instruments,  Israeli  entities will  be considered 
eligible as final recipients if they do not operate in the territories referred 
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to in point 2, either in the framework of EU-funded financial instruments 
or otherwise.
13. Any activity or part thereof (7)   included in an application for an EU grant or prize 
which does not meet the requirements set out in point 12(a) will be considered as 
ineligible and will not be considered as part of the application for the purpose of its 
further evaluation.
14. The requirements set out in section D:
(a) apply to activities under point 12 carried out by the following types of legal 
persons: Israeli regional or local authorities and other public bodies, public or 
private companies or corporations and other private legal persons, including 
non-governmental not-for-profit organisations;
(b) apply also to activities under point 12 carried out by Israeli public authorities 
at national level (ministries and government agencies or authorities);
(c) do not apply to activities under point 12 carried out by natural persons.
15. Notwithstanding points 12-14 above, the requirements set  out  in section D do not 
apply to activities which, although carried out in the territories referred to in point 2, 
aim at benefiting protected persons under the terms of international humanitarian law 
who live in these territories and/or at promoting the Middle East peace process in line 
with EU policy (8)  .
Section E.   IMPLEMENTATION ARRANGEMENTS 
16. Each Israeli entity referred to in points 11(a) and (b) and 14(a) and (b), which applies 
for an EU grant, prize or financial instrument, shall submit a declaration on honour 
as follows:
(a) In  the  case  of  grants  and  prizes,  the  declaration  will  state  that  the 
application of  the  Israeli  entity is  in  accordance with the requirements 
under points  9(a)  and 12(a)  of  these  guidelines,  while  also taking into 
account  the  applicability  of  point  15  thereof (9)  .  For  grants,  this 
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declaration  will  be  drafted  in  accordance  with  Article  131(3)  of  the 
Financial Regulation;
(b) In  the case  of  financial  instruments,  the declaration will  state  that  the 
application of the Israeli entity as a final recipient is in accordance with 
the requirements under points 9(b) and 12(b) of these guidelines.
17. The  declarations  under  point  16  are  without  prejudice  to  any  other  supporting 
documents  required  in  the  calls  for  proposals,  rules  of  contests  or  calls  for  the 
selection of financial intermediaries or dedicated investment vehicles. They will be 
included  in  the  package  of  application  documents  for  each  concerned  call  for 
proposals, rules of contests and call for the selection of financial intermediaries or 
dedicated  investment  vehicles.  Their  text  will  be  adapted  to  the  requirements 
relevant for each EU grant, prize or financial instrument.
18. The submission of a declaration under point 16 that contains incorrect information may 
be considered as a case of misrepresentation or a serious irregularity and may lead:
(a) for  grants  — to the measures  set  out  in  Articles  131(5)  and 135 of  the 
Financial Regulation;
(b) for prizes — to the measures set out in Article 212(1)(viii) of the Rules of  
Application of the Financial Regulation (10)   and;
(c) for financial instruments — to the measures set out in Article 221(3) of the 
Rules of Application of the Financial Regulation.
19. The Commission will implement these guidelines in their entirety, and in a clear and 
accessible  manner.  It  will  notably  announce  the  eligibility  conditions  set  out  in 
Sections C and D in the work programmes (11)   and/or financing decisions, calls for 
proposals, rules of contests and calls for the selection of financial intermediaries or 
dedicated investment vehicles.
20. The Commission will ensure that the work programmes and calls for proposals, rules 
of  contests  and  calls  for  the  selection  of  financial  intermediaries  or  dedicated 
investment vehicles published by the bodies entrusted with budget implementation 
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tasks under indirect management contain the eligibility conditions set out in Sections 
C and D.
21. In order to clearly articulate EU commitments under international law, taking into 
account relevant EU policies and positions, the Commission will also endeavour to 
have  the  content  of  these  guidelines  reflected  in  international  agreements  or 
protocols thereto or Memoranda of Understanding with Israeli counterparts or with 
other parties.
22. The award of EU support to Israeli entities or to their activities in the form of grants, 
prizes or financial instruments requires engagement with Israeli entities referred to 
in points 11 and 14, for  example,  by organising meetings,  visits  or  events.  Such 
engagement will not take place in the territories referred to in point 2, unless it is 
related to the activities referred to in point 15.
(1)  On the territorial application of the EU-Israel Association Agreement see Case C-386/08 Brita  
[2010] ECR I-1289, paragraphs 47 and 53.
(2)  Under Israeli law, East Jerusalem and the Golan Heights are annexed to the State of Israel, 
whereas the Gaza Strip and the rest of the West Bank are referred to as ‘the territories’.
(3)  See inter alia the Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on the MEPP adopted in December 2009, 
December 2010, April 2011, May and December 2012.
(4)  The Foreign Affairs Council conclusions on the MEPP adopted on 10 December 2012 state that  
‘all agreements between the State of Israel and the EU must unequivocally and explicitly indicate 
their inapplicability to the territories occupied by Israel in 1967’.
(5)  Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 
October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union and repealing 
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 (OJ L 298, 26.10.2012, p. 1).
(6)  In which case the Israeli entity will finance its participation with funding from other sources, 
but  will  nonetheless  be  treated  as  a  beneficiary  and  may therefore  have  access  to  know-how, 
services, networking and other opportunities developed by the other beneficiaries as a result of the 
EU grant.
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(7)  For example, these could be nation-wide projects to be implemented in Israel, which involve 
both activities within pre-1967 borders and activities beyond pre-1967 borders (e.g. in settlements).
(8)  For  example,  these  could  be  activities  under  the  European  Instrument  for  Democracy and 
Human  Rights,  the  Neighbourhood  Civil  Society  Facility  and/or  the  Partnership  for  Peace 
programme.
(9)  In  the  case  of  Israeli  public  authorities  at  national  level  (ministries  and  government 
agencies/authorities), the declaration will contain an address for communication purposes that is 
within Israel’s pre-1967 borders and that complies with point 10.
(10)  Commission Delegated Regulation (EU) No 1268/2012 of 29 October 2012 on the rules of 
application  of  Regulation (EU,  Euratom) No 966/2012 of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the 
Council of 25 October 2012 on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union (OJ 
L 362, 31.12.2012, p. 1).
(11)  Subject to the outcome of the comitology procedures that may be required by the relevant 
basic act.
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